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Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
Department of Health and Human Services 
ATTN: CMS-9940-P 
Mail Stop C4-26-05 
7500 Security Boulevard 
Baltimore, MD 21244-1850 
Submitted by Overnight Mail 
 
Re: Comment on the proposed definition of “eligible organization” for purposes of Coverage 
of Certain Preventative Services Under the Affordable Care Act [File Code CMS-9940-P] 
 
Date: October 20, 2014 
 
Dear Sir or Madam: 
 
 We write to provide comments on the matter referenced above.  We are law professors 
who for many years have taught, written about, and spoken on corporate law subjects.  All 
institutional affiliation information is provided solely for identification purposes, and no 
implication that any of our universities approve or agree with these comments is intended.  Many 
of the points set forth in this letter are elaborated on in a forthcoming article titled “Corporate 
Law after Hobby Lobby,” co-authored  by Lyman Johnson and Professor David Millon, to be 
published in the November 2014 issue of The Business Lawyer, the flagship journal of the 
American Bar Association’s Section on Business Law.  It can be accessed on SSRN at:  
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2507406. 
 
In Part I below we provide comments on your proposed rules.  In Part II, because your 




should be avoided in the rule-making process because they are not consistent with the Supreme 
Court’s reasoning in Hobby Lobby and are not consonant with generally applicable precepts of 
state corporate law or principles of federalism. 
 
I. Comments on Proposed Rules 
 A. In several places (see, e.g., pp. 3, 11, 13-14, 32), the background explanation and 
the proposed rules themselves misdescribe the Hobby Lobby ruling.  First, although the three 
companies in that litigation were “closely-held,” the Court’s reasoning decidedly was not limited 
to such companies.  Justice Alito’s opinion acknowledged that the cases before the Court did 
“not involve publicly traded corporations” and “we have no occasion in these cases to consider 
RFRA’s applicability to such companies.”1  But Justice Alito did not in principle exclude public 
companies as being able to assert RFRA claims, stating instead only that it was “unlikely” due to 
“numerous practical restraints,” and that, for factual reasons of share ownership patterns, it was 
“improbable.”2  Nowhere did the Court exclude public corporations from the universe of 
companies that could assert RFRA claims and this is because the state corporate law principles 
drawn on in Hobby Lobby permit all corporations – whether private or public − to exercise 
religion.  State law makes no distinction among corporations in that regard.  Whether a particular 
corporation does in fact exercise religion is a distinct matter, addressed below, but all 
corporations, as a matter of state corporate law, are legally empowered to do so. 
 
                                                
1  Hobby Lobby, 2014 WL 2921709 at *18. 
 





 The corporate treatises and corporate statutes cited by Justice Alito with respect to a 
corporation’s freedom to act in a non-profit-maximizing manner, and thereby exercise religion, 
are not limited in application to “closely-held” corporations,3 nor do those generally applicable 
corporation statutes even refer to or somehow distinguish “closely-held” corporations.4  The 
relevant statutory provisions appear in state general incorporation statutes that apply to all 
corporations organized under their provisions, public as well as privately-held.  Federal “exercise 
of religion” claims under RFRA, as a practical matter and as Justice Alito noted, likely will be 
made by close corporations, but the Court’s reasoning on the permissibility of pursuing broad, 
non-commercial purposes under state corporate law, such as the exercise of religion, applies to 
all companies.  This necessarily is the case because under state corporate law there simply is no 
basis for contending that general state incorporation statutes − and judicial interpretations of 
them − do not apply categorically to all corporations, except where the statute itself provides 
otherwise.5  Thus, there is no principled basis for construing the Hobby Lobby Court’s views on 
corporate freedom to exercise religion as limited to “closely-held” corporations.  In ruling that 
the three closely-held corporations before it had the legal power to exercise religion, the Court 
looked to state law sources equally applicable to public companies. 
 
 Second, throughout the proposed rules – and in the background material preceding it − 
the term “for-profit” is used.  The Court and Justice Ginsburg in Hobby Lobby also used that 
term for ease of reference and to distinguish “non-profit” corporations.  In fact, the Oklahoma 
                                                
3  Id. at *15-16. 
 
4  As addressed later in this letter, some states do have special “close corporation” statutory provisions, but 
those were not involved in Hobby Lobby and are only very infrequently even used. 
 





corporation statute involved in the Hobby Lobby case does not use that term; nor does the 
Delaware corporate statute or the widely adopted Model Business Corporation Act.  The 
standard terminology is “business corporation.”  This term better captures the related statutory 
fact that state corporate codes do not require that business corporations pursue profits at the 
expense of competing considerations, a point explicitly noted by the Court and central to its 
reasoning.6 
 
 Third, throughout the proposed rules – and in the background material preceding it − the 
Hobby Lobby opinion is misdescribed as grounded on the “owners’” religious beliefs.  The 
Court, of course, held that the corporations themselves had a free exercise right.  Prior to even 
addressing the issue of whether a business corporation could “exercise religion,” the Court had to 
decide – which it did – that such a corporation was, in its own right, a “person” under RFRA.  As 
a matter of state corporate law, moreover, “owners” or “shareholders” (in corporate businesses) 
are not legally identical to the corporation itself and they neither formulate a corporation’s 
business policies nor direct the business and affairs of a corporation.7  That function belongs to 
the board of directors in all states.  See Del. Code tit 8 §141(a); Model Business Corporation Act 
§8.01(a).  Thus the question of whether a business corporation will or will not “exercise religion” 
is a question to be resolved by the board of directors under state law, not shareholders.  A board 
of directors acts in only one of two ways:  either at a meeting where, if a quorum is present, 
decisions are made by a majority vote – unanimity is not required − or alternatively, a board may 
                                                
6  2014 WL 2921709 at *15.  See Ronald J. Colombo, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE BUSINESS 
CORPORATION (Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2015); Ronald J. Colombo, The Naked Private Square, 51 
HOUSTON L. REV. 1 (2013). 
 
7  Shareholders are not “owners” of the corporation.  The corporation holds legal title to and owns its own 
assets, and shareholders own only the corporation’s stock.  The distinction is important because ownership of the 





act without meeting if all directors sign an appropriate written consent.  No shareholder 
involvement is necessary or required when a board so acts.  Few indeed are the matters on which 
shareholders are permitted to vote or consent under state corporate law:  electing and removing 
directors, amending the articles of incorporation and bylaws, and voting on mergers, sales, and 
so on.  Beyond that, shareholders have no role in directing a corporation’s business and affairs. 
 
 The persons involved in the Hobby Lobby Stores corporation in the Hobby Lobby case 
made this clear in arguing that they “cannot in good conscience direct their corporations to 
provide insurance coverage for the four drugs,…” (emphasis added).  That directors, not 
shareholders, are the key decision-makers in business corporations is a basic and uniform state 
corporate law principle of the type relied on by the Court in Hobby Lobby and in numerous cases 
prior to that.  See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U. S. 69, 91 (1987) (“the 
corporation…owes its existence and attributes to state law”); Burks v. Lasker, 441 U. S. 471, 478 
(1979).  A federal administrative agency has no legal authority to somehow engraft onto state 
corporate law the requirement of shareholder consent (unanimous or otherwise) to corporate 
action when underlying state law imposes no such obligation.  The cases cited above, including 
Hobby Lobby itself, recognize that state law alone determines the core features of business 
corporations. 
 
 B. Because, as a matter of state law and the reasoning of the Supreme Court in 
Hobby Lobby, any business corporation may exercise religion in its business operations if the 
board of directors elects and follows through on that course of action,8 the proposed rules should 
                                                
8  That policy decision might be set forth in a board-adopted “Vision Statement,” “Statement of Values,” or it 




not categorically exclude certain types of corporations from the definition of “eligible 
organizations.”  The rules might, of course, create a “safe harbor” – one, however, that should 
give wide berth – for certain types of corporations, but they should still permit other corporations 
(and entities) to obtain an exemption.  If a numerical limit on the number of shareholders is 
chosen as one factor for the safe harbor it should be a large number, such as the threshold for 
reporting obligations under the federal securities laws – i.e., 2,000 shareholders.  Thus, the safe 
harbor could and should, with respect to that specific factor, define “eligible organization” as any 
corporation that is not a publicly reporting company under federal securities laws, the board of 
directors of which has determined will exercise religion in its business affairs. 
 
II. Approaches to Avoid in Rulemaking 
 A. Although the three companies in the Hobby Lobby litigation were “family owned” 
(indirectly), there is no principled basis for limiting “eligible organization” to such types of 
companies.  That descriptor – “family owned” – is unknown to state business law and is 
irrelevant to it.  To provide an example, a company the stock of which is owned and the affairs 
of which are directed by ten Olson family members is not any more able to “exercise religion” in 
its business affairs than a company the stock of which is owned and the affairs of which are 
directed by one Olson family member and one Steinheimer family member. 
 
 This comment is an extension of the view set forth in Part I above.  Just as general state 
corporation laws apply equally to public and private corporations so too they apply equally to 
“family owned” and non family-owned companies. 
                                                                                                                                                       
too can employ bylaw amendments to cause the corporation to exercise religion – or to influence how it does so – if 
the board does not do so.  See Alan J. Meese and Nathan B. Oman, Hobby Lobby, Corporate Law, and the Theory of 




 B. There is no principled basis for limiting “eligible organizations” to corporations 
organized as “benefit corporations” or as statutory close corporations.  None of the three 
corporations involved in Hobby Lobby was organized as a benefit corporation (a form of 
organization available only since 2010) or under a special close corporation statute.  
Pennsylvania, the state of incorporation of Conestoga Wood Specialties, Inc., a party in Hobby 
Lobby, has such a statute (19 Pa. Code ch. 27), but Conestoga Wood was not organized under it.  
The Court in Hobby Lobby in no way required such a limitation because it is simply an option 
under state law, not a requirement.  In fact, close corporation statutory elections are so 
infrequently made that several years ago the American Bar Association’s Section on Business 
Law withdrew such a supplement from its Model Business Corporation Act.  On principles of 
federalism and the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Hobby Lobby, there is no legal warrant for the 
proposed rules to so radically limit eligibility.  Such an approach would simply be a back door ex 
post way to try to avoid the full reach of the binding Supreme Court ruling in Hobby Lobby.9  
The same is true for any approach seeking to tie the definition of “eligible organization” to the 
rules or statutes of any particular state, whether Delaware or any other state.  Each state has the 
undoubted legal authority to specify the attributes of corporateness for companies organized 
under its laws.  No single state’s corporate laws directly or indirectly (via HHS rules) should 
become the federal law for all others on this important issue, especially since Congress itself has 
steadfastly refused to adopt a federal corporation statute. 
 
 C. Any approach to rulemaking that is grounded on supposed concerns about 
director or officer fiduciary duties is irrelevant to sound rules.  It is not within HHS authority to 
                                                
9  For  critiques of a failed pre-Hobby Lobby effort to deny that business corporations have RFRA rights, see 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Critique of the Corporate Law Professors’ Amicus Brief in Hobby Lobby and  Conestoga 




address fiduciary duty issues, a matter of state law and one that necessarily is fact-sensitive and 
thus one uniquely suited for judicial resolution.  Moreover, boards of directors have enormous 
discretion in making decisions and, among other matters, need not heed or follow the 
recommendations of shareholders.  They are free to – indeed they must – exercise their own 
independent business judgment.  Shareholder votes or consents standing alone are, as noted in 
Part I, of no legal force under general corporate statutes that uniformly place plenary decision-
making power in the board of directors. 
 
 D. The proposed rules should not require unanimous shareholder (or other owner) 
consent because neither Hobby Lobby nor state corporate law principles require such a highly 
unusual requirement.  The Supreme Court stated that business corporations, “with ownership 
approval, support a wide variety of charitable causes.”10  And the Court also said, “So long as its 
owners agree,”11 a corporation may deviate from profit maximization.12  One might be tempted 
to construe the words “with ownership approval” and “so long as owners agree” as implying that 
all must so agree.  But that simply is not what those passages say or mean.  Nowhere does the 
Court use the words “all” or “unanimous” or anything like them.  Justice Alito, in this portion of 
the opinion, is not addressing the nuances of the voting rules for shareholders under state 
corporate law, which, in any event, are governed by a majoritarian principle, not rules of 
unanimity.   
                                                
10  2014 WL 2921709 at *15. 
 
11  Id. 
 
12  Of course, under state law a corporation can make charitable contributions without any shareholder 
involvement; that too is a matter for the board of directors.  This and numerous other points emphasizing board of 
director authority in the post-Hobby Lobby context are elaborated by Professor Brett McDonnell.  Brett McDonnell, 





 Moreover, in responding to Justice Ginsberg’s dissent, Justice Alito explicitly takes up 
the question of “disputes among the owners of corporations.”13  He acknowledges that “the 
owners of a company might well have a dispute relating to religion.”14  If so, then necessarily all 
shareholders do not agree on business policy and unanimity thereby is lacking.  But that does not 
mean that, lacking unanimous agreement, the business cannot exercise religion.  It means 
precisely what Justice Alito then notes:  “State corporate law provides a ready means for 
resolving any conflicts by, for example, dictating how a corporation can establish its governing 
structure.… Courts will turn to that structure and the underlying state law in resolving 
disputes.”15  And as noted, the default voting rule in corporate governance is a lower threshold 
than unanimity.  The treatise to which Alito cites at this point in his opinion refers, quite 
conventionally, to “simple majority vote.”16 
 
 Further, as noted in Part I above, on questions of business policy, including charitable 
contributions and strategic and operational decisions that sacrifice profits for other 
considerations – whether to exercise religion or otherwise − shareholders ordinarily have no 
voting rights at all.  It is for the board of directors to decide such questions, and even in the 
boardroom unanimity is not required.  If the shareholders disagree with a board-level decision, 
their primary recourse will be to act to remove directors at the annual election of directors or at a 
special meeting held for that purpose.  Absent an unusual charter or by-law provision, directors 
                                                
13  2014 WL 2921709 at *19. 
 
14  Id.  Justice Alito cites as an example some stockholders wishing to remain open on the Sabbath to make 
more money while other stockholders might want to close for religious reasons.  Id. 
 
15  Id.   
 
16  Id.  See Alan Meese, Hobby Lobby, Shareholder Primacy and Profit Maximization, 




are the key decision-makers in corporations and neither they nor shareholders (where they do get 
to vote) must act with unanimity. 
 
 In short, by acting appropriately through the legally mandated corporate governance 
structure, a majority of directors will chart business policy.17  One aspect of this is deciding how, 
if at all, religious or other philosophical or social policy beliefs will play a role in shaping that 
strategy.  As the key decisionmakers address that question, the usual default governance and 
majoritarian voting rules will apply, not a highly-unusual unanimity rule that would obtain only 
if specifically agreed ex ante.  The decision to engage in − or refrain from − non-maximizing of 
profits behavior of all sorts, including the exercise of religion through business affairs, will thus 
be decided in the customary way under standard corporate law rules. 
Very truly yours, 
Lyman Johnson 
Robert O. Bentley Professor of Law 
Washington and Lee University 
    School of Law 
Lexington, VA 
    and Professor of Law 
University of St. Thomas  





J. B. Stombock Professor of Law 
Washington and Lee University 
    School of Law 
Lexington, VA 
 
(Additional signatures on following page) 
 
 
                                                
17  See generally, Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy:  The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 
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